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which each section will be applicable. It would seem inconsistent
first to disregard a group of corporations as "unreal" and then
apply a section of the code which authorizes attacks on "real"
corporations. To the extent that the Aldon decision avoids this
inconsistency, it appears to be sound.
C. A. King II
LABOR LAW - THE EFFECT GIVEN TO AN ARBITRATION AWARD BY
THE NLRB IN AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE HEARING
Under the National Labor Relations Act as amended a prob-
lem exists where an arbitration award deals with the subject
matter of conduct which may be an unfair labor practice. It is
clear that the Board can entertain jurisdiction when an arbi-
tration award is interposed as a bar to an unfair labor practice
proceeding. Section 10(a) provides: "The Board is empowered
... to prevent any persons from engaging in any unfair labor
practice affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise."' How-
ever, it is particularly important to notice that the act does not
require, with one exception, 2 that the Board always exercise its
jurisdictional power; it merely gives the Board exclusive juris-
diction when the Board does decide to exercise it.
Prior to the case of Spielberg Mfg. Co. & Harold Gruenberg,3
the Board apparently had not formulated any comprehensive
criteria by which it would determine whether to accept an arbi-
tration award as a binding settlement of the dispute presented
as an unfair labor practice. In that case four strikers, dis-
charged for their conduct during the strike, were refused re-
instatment by an arbitration award which the union, company,
and discharged strikers had agreed was to be binding. The dis-
charged strikers were represented by counsel, and three of the
four were present during the arbitration. Subsequently these
discharged strikers filed unfair labor practice charges. The
Board dismissed the complaint and accepted the arbitration
award as binding. In doing this the Board enumerated the
criteria to be met before the Board would defer the exercise of
its jurisdiction to an arbitration award. The three criteria are:
1. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1947).
2. Labor Management Relations Disclosure Act § 701 (1959).
3. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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(1) the proceedings must appear to have been fair and regular;
(2) all of the parties must have acquiesced in the proceedings;
and (3) the arbitrtation award clearly must not be repugnant
to the purposes and policies of the act. The Board strengthened
its policy decision of abstention in cases where the criteria are
met by declaring that "this does not mean that the Board would
necessarily decide the issue of the alleged strike misconduct as
the arbitration panel did. We do not pass on that issue."' 4 This
seems to make apparent the Board's policy of giving full effect
to an arbitration award which avoids the necessity of facing an
unfair labor practice charge when the three criteria are met.
The first criterion - the proceedings appear to have been
fair and regular - was applied in IAM & New Britain Machine
Co.,5 wherein the Board found that he agreed-upon grievance
machinery had been utilized fairly, and in the same manner as
the parties had always utilized it in handling other grievances.
The Board stated that the arbitration proceeding was "a fair
and valid voluntary settlement of the factual issues presented."6
The exact meaning of "fair and regular" has not been clearly
defined by the Board, but some help as to its meaning may pos-
sibly be obtained by considering a few instances where the courts
have passed on motions to affirm or vacate arbitration awards.
Thus, when a company withdrew from the proceedings before
formal notice of the award, but after learning that the award
would be unfavorable, the court enforced the award, finding
that the proceedings were in order and that the company's with-
drawal was in bad faith.7 It has also been held that a proceeding
will be nullified when the arbitrator is at fault, such as for-
getting to mention to the union that he had been a partner of
the employer,8 or when the arbitrator allowed the union to amend
its petition without informing the employer and rendered an
award on the amended petition.9 Generally, an award will be
sustained unless the complaining party claims and produces evi-
dence of fraud, corruption, or other misconduct on the part of
the arbitrator.10 Where a party does not have the benefit of
counsel, the award is enforceable as being fair if the lack of
4. Id. at 1082.
5. 116 N.L.R.B. 645 (1956), rev. on other grounds, 247 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.
1957).
6. Id. at 646.
7. Shoeworkers Ass'n v. Federal Shoes, Inc., 150 Maine 432 (1955).
8. In re Siegal, 153 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
9. In re Goldman, 166 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
10. See Grant v. Atlas Powder Co., 241 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1957); In re
B & M Cleaners & Dyers, 26 Lab. Arb. 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
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counsel is due to the complainant's failure to procure counsel."
Apparently, proceedings are "fair and regular" in the eyes of
the court where the arbitrator is honest, all parties are heard
who desire to be heard and who have the right to be heard,'
1 2
and the award is within the power of the arbitrator. 3
The purpose of the second criterion - all of the parties must
have acquiesced in the proceeidngs - appears to be to insure
that all parties concerned have consented to a voluntary settle-
ment by arbitration. What this consent consists of is nowhere
clearly spelled out. Where arbitration is not provided for in
the contract, the problem of determining if all of the parties
have acquiesced does not appear too difficult. In Wertheimer
Stores Corp. & Samuel Weiss14 the Board found that the em-
ployee had not acquiesced in the arbitration proceeding insti-
tuted by the employer and the union, relying on the fact that
immediately upon discharge the employee had filed unfair labor
practice charges with the Board and had continued to press the
charges after the arbitration proceeding. Apparently there was
no arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
Until the Board becomes more specific in its definitions there
will be doubt as to what constitutes "acquiescence." However,
the court decisions offer some possible indications. An example
of acquiescence was presented where an individual employee had
instigated the arbitration proceeding and had been ruled against
in a fair hearing. There a court held that because the employee
had instituted the arbitration proceedings he had consented, and
the award barred an action of law on the same issues. Where
the contract does contain provisions for grievance machinery
terminating in arbitration, the essential question seems to be the
extent to which its existence restricts the right of the employee
to assert his individual claim in some other forum after an ad-
verse arbitration award has been made. Under the Board's
requirement of acquiescence, this would appear to depend upon
whether the employee consented to a settlement of his claim by
arbitration. If the employee invoked the grievance machinery
by lodging a claim with the union and stood by while the claim
11. In re Rosengart, 169 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
12. In re Iroquois Beverage Corp., 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
13. In re Minkoff, 29 Lab. Arb. 737 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957). See, for sugges-
tions as to other situations which might be grounds for refusal to accept an award
as binding, Uniform Arbitration Act, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE
ARBITRATION PROCESS, Appendix D (BNA 1956).
14.-107 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1954).
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was processed and finally disposed of by arbitration, there would
seem to be little difficulty in finding that he had acquiesced.
This; is ample, evidence from which an inference of consent may
be drawn.15 Suppose, however, an employee has manifested lack
of confidence in the fair disposition of his claim by arbitration
by filing charges with the Board contending that the conduct
underlying his claim constitutes an unfair labor practice, or by
unsuccessfully seeking to intervene in the arbitration proceed-
ing. Some of the recent court cases involving the assertion of
contract claims by individual employees suggest that the fore-
going would be acquiescence sufficient to permit the adverse
award to bar the Board's jurisdiction. Thus, in Parker v. Bo-
rock1 the New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's
right of action on the contract was precluded by the contractual
grievance and arbitration machinery. However, the decision is
not' too pertinent, for the Board is not concerned solely with the
question of whether arbitration is the exclusive method for dis-
posing of claims arising under the contract. The question before
the Board is whether, as a matter of policy, it should accept the
award as a definitive disposition of a dispute in which unfair
labor practices issues lurk. In the case of a union member, the
Board might fashion a policy that acquiescence is to be inferred
from the fact of membership, but that acquiescence is only for
the disposition of his claim by "fair and regular" proceedings.
For example, the employee could impeach the award as a bar
upon a showing that there was collusion between the employer
and the union in the arbitration proceedings.1 T While the case
of the non-union employee is more troublesome, it seems that if
he invoked the grievance machinery, or was content with the
disposition of his claim by arbitration until an adverse award
was entered, an inference of acquiescence should be drawn from
such evidence. Under these circumstances the suggested policy
should:be applied to both union and non-union employees. How-
ever, suppose that the non-union employee was one of several
grievants similarly situated and that he objected at every stage
of the proceedings to the disposition of his claim under the
grievance and arbitration machinery. He could hardly be said
to have acquiesced except, perhaps, on the theory that an em-
ployee acquiesces in the settlement of his claims by arbitration
by .accepting employment under an agreement which calls for
Cf_5. 0.Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry.. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
16' 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d 297, 5 N.Y.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1959).
17. Cf. Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 180 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1958).
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the disposition of grievances through the arbitration machinery.
Perhaps the best method to balance the public rights of the
group as given to the bargaining representative of the unit, and
the private rights of the individual, is to accord full effect- to
the collective bargaining agreement insofar as it specifies the
power of the union to arbitrate and to rely on the "fair and
regular" test to insure that the individual gets just treatment
in the arbitration. Where the individual's rights are sought to
be arbitrated without reliance on a provision in the contract,
the most equitable solution would seem to be reached by re-
quiring consent either by express word or action on the part of
the individual, as by consenting in so many words, or by parti-
cipating in the arbitration.
The third criterion- the award clearly must not be re-
pugnant to the purposes and policies of the act - was applied in
Monsanto Chemical Co. & George W. Draper.' There the arbi-
tration award upheld a discharge based upon a union security
provision of the agreement, which allowed the discharge of
employees for certain non-compliance with the union's rules.
The Board found that the contract provision was not in effect
at the time it was invoked, and therefore reliance on such a non-
contractual provision was a statutory violation. The Board stated
"there can be no justification for deeming ourselves bound, as
a matter of policy, by an arbitration award which is at odds
with the Statute."'19 Like the other criteria announced in the
Spielberg case, the term "clearly repugnant" suffers from
nebulousness. Again, due to the dearth of Board cases on the
subject, it is helpful to look to the courts when seeking the
meaning of "clearly repugnant." In the case of Western Union
Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, CIO,20 the union
employees refused to handle messages sent by non-union em-
ployees of international telegraph companies which were struck
by their union employees. The contract provided that there
should be no work stoppage, and specifically stated that the
arbitrator did not have authority to modify the contract. The
arbitrator sustained the right of the employees to refuse to
handle the "hot" work, on the basis of custom in the industry,
and ordered the reinstatement of the suspended workers. The
lower court confirmed the award, but on appeal it was vacated,
since the court found that the award modified the contract and
18. 97 N.L.R.B. 517 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953).
19. Id. at 520.
20.-299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1949).
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therefore the arbitrator had exceeded his power. The court
stated that where the language in the contract was clear and
unambiguous there was no justification for the arbitrator to go
outside its provisions to interpret it. Thus, by merely looking to
the award and the contract on which it was based, the court
found a conflict. It is suggested that a comparable interpretation
could well be given the NLRA as amended, and the arbitration
award, when the Board applies its "clearly repugnant" criterion.
Such an interpretation, without looking behind the award, will
best serve the purpose of effectuating arbitration as a means
of settling disputes, and yet guarantees adherence to the provi-
sions of the act.
The purposes and policies of the act appear to substantiate
the Board's position as postulated in the Spielberg case, albeit
the criteria are somewhat indefinite. These policies are clearly
expressed in Title I, Section 1, of the Act which provides that
"experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards com-
merce from injury ... by encouraging practices fundamental to
the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences."'2 1 This policy exposition is buttressed by Title II,
Section 203(d), which provides that "final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. ' 22 In addition to this statutory support
several other reasons favor the Board's interpretation of the
purposes and policies. The Board's policy respects the integrity
of the collective bargaining process, wherein the parties bargain
and voluntarily concur in the terms of the agreement. Recogni-
tion of the arbitration fosters voluntary agreement as to the
terms by permitting the parties to have the disputed provisions
settled by a person of their choice, without government inter-
ference or intervention. As a practical matter, the policy ex-
pedites the settlement of disputes, and facilitates quicker action
by the Board on other matters. This is quite important since at
present the average time between filing a charge and a Board
decision on the charge is 465 days, while an additional average
delay of 378 days is required to secure judicial enforcement of
that award. 23 Minimum delays in settlement should result in less
21. Labot Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947).
22. Id. at § 173.
23. Report of the Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law to the
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hardship to the parties, and consequently less bitterness should
build up that would possibly impair labor-management relations.
The present policy is also in accord with the Board's related
policy which requires that parties having binding agreements
to arbitrate must arbitrate before seeking Board relief, as to
matters submissible to arbitration.2 4 A failure to give effect to
the subsequent award would nullify this related policy.
It is concluded that the policy of the Board gives full effect
to the purposes and policies of the act, while respecting the in-
tentions of the parties as much as the act permits. This enables
the parties to rely on the collective bargaining process to reach
terms mutually satisfactory, with full knowledge that so long
as the three criteria are met, labor disputes may be settled au-
thoritatively by arbitration even though they involve issues of
potential interest to the NLRB.
Merwin M. Brandon, Jr.
MINERAL RIGHTS - RIGHTS OF THE NAKED
OWNER AND THE USUFRUCTUARY
The naked owners executed a mineral lease on property which
they owned subject to a usufruct, and about a year later the
usufructuary executed a mineral lease on the same land. Subse-
quently, plaintiffs, the naked owners and their lessee, sought a
declaratory judgment asking that the usufructuary be declared
to be without any right to the minerals under the land and that
he therefore had no authority to grant a mineral lease on it.
Each party prayed that their lease be recognized as valid and
that the lease of the other party be cancelled. The trial judge
held for the plaintiffs, but declared that the rights of the lessee
were subordinate to the rights of the usufructuary and the lessee
could not enter and use the land subject to the usufruct without
the consent of the usufructuary.' On appeal to the Supreme
Court, held, affirmed as amended. The rights of the usufruct-
uary to the oil and gas under the land are governed by Article
552 of the Civil Code and he is not entitled to the proceeds of
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the Organization and Procedure
of the National Labor Relations Board, S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
CCH Lab. L. Rep. No. 602, p. 12 (Feb. 11, 1960).
24. See United Tel. Co. of the West, Inc., & International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local No. 843, AFL, 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955).
1. The lessee of the naked owner was, however, according to the, view of the
trial court entitled to extract the minerals under the land subject to the usufruct
by directional drilling.
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